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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the proper role of comparative law in the jurisprudence of
American courts has become a hotly debated and controversial topic. The
question was brought to the forefront of the legal community’s attention
following a number of United States Supreme Court decisions, perhaps most
notably in Atkins v. Virginia 1 and Roper v. Simmons, 2 rulings that addressed
the constitutionality of administering the death penalty to mentally retarded and
juvenile defendants. In both decisions, the Court was divided on whether to
regard foreign laws and practices as indicative of an evolving standard of
decency when determining whether a punishment should be considered “cruel
and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Those who oppose reference to comparative law have argued that the use
of foreign opinions to interpret domestic law unduly imposes foreign “moods,
fads, or fashions” upon Americans. 3 Since laws are enacted by democratically
elected representatives, the experience and legislation of other jurisdictions is
immaterial and should carry little, if any, authority in their interpretation. 4
Critics contend that using foreign law to determine the proper scope of
American legislation may award judges a legislative or treaty-ratifying power,
an authority clearly reserved by the Constitution for other branches of
government. 5 Judges who have used comparative law in formulating their
opinions have been accused of “cherry picking” foreign law that supports their
opinions; they have been charged with “sophistry” and disguising their personal
and political preferences behind a mask of international consensus. 6
Proponents of comparative law have countered that although foreign law
should not bind American courts, surveying international practices and
exploring the approaches of other nations may lend American courts useful
insight into common problems and affirm their convictions about correct

1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
321-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 622.
6. Id. at 627.
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solutions. As Justice Kennedy has said, “The opinion of the world community,
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions.” 7 Others have emphasized comparative
law’s crucial role in prompting us to challenge the necessity and wisdom of
doctrines to which we have grown accustomed and that we might view as
unchangeable. Foreign law reminds us that other, and perhaps better, solutions
might exist elsewhere. 8 True, supporters allow, the citation of foreign law may
be prone to abuse, but such risks are neither unique to nor inherent in the use of
comparative law. 9
Despite considerable attention given to the proper role of comparative law
in interpreting domestic law, legal scholarship in the United States has
concentrated primarily on the use of foreign law by American courts. But
especially for those who have emphasized the relevance of foreign experience
in addressing common legal dilemmas, examining the approach of foreign
courts toward comparative law is an equally informative and relevant inquiry.
The use of comparative law by courts is by no means a uniquely American
practice; the United States in fact does relatively little of it in comparison to
other nations. This Note, therefore, takes a different course: it focuses primarily
on the role played by comparative law in the jurisprudence of a foreign
jurisdiction—one that frequently relies upon comparative law—and the
problems this practice has bred. That is, it offers a comparative angle to the use
of comparative law.
More specifically, I offer a case study of a recent decision of the Israeli
Supreme Court in Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor, 10 which dealt with
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. For many reasons the Israeli
Supreme Court has often relied heavily on comparative law when formulating
its own opinions. However, despite frequent citation of foreign authorities by
Israeli courts, this practice has largely escaped controversy. Cases making key
use of comparative law therefore abound, as do complications to which this
practice may lead. Examining the Israeli use of comparative law also helps
underscore some of the differences between the objections raised in the United
States and concerns that exist in other countries, highlighting those that are
uniquely American and pointing out why the United States may have less to
fear from foreign law than some critics suggest.
The Note also addresses a debate closely related to the controversy
surrounding the use of comparative law: the possibility and desirability of legal
7. Id. at 578.
8. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1227 (1999).
9. See Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking
the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275,
1297-98 (2006).
10. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet published),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/98051210.n21.pdf.
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transplants. Opponents of legal transplanting have argued that the deep ties
between legal rules and the culture and traditions in which they develop often
make it difficult or unwise to transplant the legal rules of one jurisdiction into
the judicial system of another. Pierre Legrand, one of the most prominent
critics of legal transplants, warns that transplanted doctrines often fail to
maintain their original meaning in a new environment and that therefore courts
should borrow cautiously and with limited expectations. 11 He and others have
criticized the work of “comparativist transplanters,” who through the citation of
foreign doctrines create a sense of false consensus regarding legal rules. Critics
argue that such formal citation of foreign law often overlooks the unique
character and operation of a doctrine in its original setting, blurring in the
process the distinction between self and other. In contrast, proponents of legal
transplants emphasize the important role foreign doctrines have played in legal
development since time immemorial. 12 According to Alan Watson and other
scholars, it would be impossible to imagine a modern legal system that did not
borrow or was not influenced in significant ways by laws originating
elsewhere. Legal rules are readily transplanted, they say, and the links between
law and culture, history, economics, and language are easily exaggerated.
In the hunt for a test case to add substance to this debate, I offer an indepth analysis of Israel’s exclusionary rule to assess the challenges of
translating and transplanting doctrines across borders and cultures. My choice
to focus on evidence law stems from the particular challenges that its
transplantation poses. 13 The strong ties between rules of evidence and the
broader institutional context in which they are administered suggest that
evidence law can provide unique insight into the dangers of legal borrowing
and the use of comparative law. 14 The exclusionary rule, 15 a doctrine
intimately linked to judicial structure, offers a particularly illustrative test

11. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997).
12. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
22-24 (2d ed. 1993); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4.4
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., Dec. 2000, http://www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html.
13. See Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: AngloAmerican and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (1997).
14. I allude here to factors such as the identity of the fact finder, lay or professional,
whether the court is unitary or bifurcated, the temporal organization of proceedings, and the
allocation of procedural control between the judge and the parties. See id. at 840.
15. I use the term “exclusionary rule” in this Note as a shorthand for the exclusion of
evidence obtained illegally (through the violation of rules governing search and seizure for
example). This is only part of the greater category of exclusionary rules and more
specifically, of the many extrinsic exclusionary rules, i.e., rules that reject probative
information for the sake of values unrelated to the pursuit of truth (such as the protection of
defendants’ rights). Other such extrinsic exclusionary rules are those which address
privileges. Intrinsic exclusionary rules are those designed to enhance the accuracy of factfinding. See MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 12-17 (1997).
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case. 16 Hence, in Part I, I examine the Issacharov decision, in which the Israeli
Supreme Court redefined the exclusionary rule in what the Court proclaimed to
be a groundbreaking decision. Was the decision in fact as revolutionary as it
suggests? The Court’s considerable, and often questionable, reliance upon
comparative law may have misled the Court to see an unremarkable case as
groundbreaking.
Issacharov is only the most recent attempt by the Israeli Supreme Court to
transplant foreign exclusionary rules into Israel. In Part II, I provide a historical
look at four stages in the development of the exclusionary rule in Israeli
evidence law to further illustrate the inherent difficulties of legal transplanting.
That Part explores the Israeli Supreme Court’s ongoing struggle to define and
translate “admissibility,” a term which developed primarily in bifurcated jury
systems, into Israel’s unitary judiciary. During different eras in Israeli history
admissibility has connoted different aspects of the common law term, yet
without capturing its full and true essence.
Part III addresses the risks of treating foreign law as precedent and the
dangers of legal emulation. I ask why the Israeli Supreme Court has relied so
heavily upon the common law in shaping Israel’s evidence rules, despite the
fundamental differences between Israel and other common law jurisdictions. 17
Finally, Part IV evaluates the rhetorical role of comparative law as a tool
for legitimizing judicial innovation. I discuss how comparative law can be
(mis)used to create a sense of international consensus concerning an issue
highly debated within a jurisdiction. I consider how comparative law can
bolster the power of courts to “revolutionize” and how it served such functions
in Issacharov.
I. EXCLUDING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN ISRAEL: THE ISSACHAROV
DECISION
In May 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Issacharov, 18 awarding Israeli courts the discretion to exclude illegally
obtained evidence. The decision was hailed by many as “a revolution in Israeli
evidence law.” 19 Rafael Issacharov, a private in the Israel Defense Forces
16. On the links between exclusion and bifurcation and why “[t]he unitary structure of
Continental courts . . . bedevils the employment of extrinsic exclusionary rules—such as . . .
those rejecting improperly obtained confessions,” see id. at 49.
17. Legal scholars often link the development of the unique Anglo-American rules of
evidence to lay adjudication and the need to protect lay fact finders from potentially
unreliable information. See MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 180 (1986); see also
GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1-2 (2002).
18. CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet published),
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/98051210.n21.pdf.
19. See Efrat Porscher, Illegally Obtained Confessions May Be Excluded, NRG, May
4, 2006, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/170/923.html; Tal Rosner, The Supreme Court
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(IDF), had been arrested for absence without leave. Entering a military prison,
he was strip-searched and marijuana was found in his underwear. Issacharov
was taken for interrogation but was not warned of his right to an attorney.
During this interrogation, he provided the Military Police with a urine sample
that indicated previous drug use, and he admitted to prior possession and use of
marijuana. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that Issacharov’s confession
and the physical evidence he provided should be excluded because the
defendant was not informed of his right to an attorney. The defendant was
acquitted of three counts of prior use and possession and convicted only for
possession of the marijuana found on him. 20
The opinion of the Court in Issacharov distinguished the new doctrine,
which gave courts the discretion to exclude evidence, from the old doctrine
established in 1978 in Meiri v. Israel. 21 Under Meiri courts were able to reduce
the weight awarded to illegally obtained evidence—and in some cases even
give such evidence no weight at all—but could not exclude it. 22 According to
the Issacharov Court, the creation of an exclusionary rule for illegally obtained
evidence should be viewed as part of the larger “Constitutional Revolution”
that has swept Israel since the passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty in 1992. The law created a new balance between crime control and due
process, leading to a greater protection of the defendant’s procedural rights.
This protection translated into the greater power and willingness of courts to
exclude illegally obtained evidence, not merely diminish its weight. 23
Comparative law played an important role in the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Issacharov, both as a basis for the Court’s authority to create an
Rules that Confession Without a Defense Attorney Present is Inadmissible, YNET, May 4,
2006, available at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3246887,00.html; Yuval Yoaz,
The Supreme Court: Courts May Exclude Evidence Obtained Illegally, HAARETZ, May 5,
2006, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=712770.
The headnotes introducing the case in the Nevo database (which is comparable to Lexis or
Westlaw) characterize Issacharov as “a revolutionary precedent which adopts the
exclusionary rule into the Israeli legal system. In this case, a confession obtained before the
detainee was given the right to consult with an attorney was excluded.” Nevo Database,
http://www.nevo.co.il/serve/home/it/titleslawlink.asp?build=2&System=1&Exec=&cpq=&P
rocNum=5121&ProcYear=98&Process=%D7%A2%D7%A4&lawlink=11 (last visited April
6, 2008).
However, there are also those who have expressed skepticism about how revolutionary
Issacharov really is. See Ron Shapira, Not Such Big News: The Decision to Exclude Illegally
Obtained Evidence Promises More than It Can Deliver, HAARETZ, May 9, 2006, available at
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=713879&contrassID=2&subC
ontrassID=3&sbSubContrassID=0.
20. Issacharov [2006] § 82.
21. CrimA 559/77 Meiri v. State [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 180.
22. Although Israeli courts had the power to diminish the weight of evidence to zero
under Meiri, this authority was rarely exercised. See Eliahu Harnon, Illegally Obtained
Evidence: A Comparative Survey, in 2 STUDIES IN HONOR OF JUSTICE MOSHE LANDAU 983,
1021 (Aharon Barak & Elinoar Mazuz eds., 1995).
23. Issacharov [2006] §§ 47, 54.
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exclusionary rule and in determining the scope of the new doctrine. When
addressing the anticipated criticism that establishing an exclusionary rule
should be left to the Israeli parliament, the Court turned to “legal systems that
are similar to our own.” 24 It showed that even in the absence of explicit
legislative authorization, the United States, England, and Australia all
developed an exclusionary rule through judicial fiat, sometimes followed later
by legislative approval. 25
The Supreme Court also relied upon comparative law in formulating the
proper scope of the exclusionary rule, turning again to a series of “legal
systems that are similar to our own,” namely common law jurisdictions. 26 The
Court first examined the primary objectives served by exclusion in different
jurisdictions. 27 It distinguished between the American model, which
concentrates primarily on deterring the police from obtaining evidence
illegally, 28 and the Canadian and English models, which emphasize exclusion’s
24. See Issacharov [2006] §§ 40, 50, 55.
25. Id. § 50. The Israeli Supreme Court cited Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197
(P.C.) (E. Afr.), as establishing the rule later adopted in England in Section 78 of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and Bunning v. Cross, (1978) 141 C.L.R. 54, as the
antecedent of Section 138 of the Australian Uniform Evidence Act 1995. Even though the
Court in Issacharov does not state so specifically, it appears to be relying on dictum from
Kuruma in which the Lords stated that “[n]o doubt in a criminal case the judge always has a
discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly
against an accused.” Kuruma, [1955] A.C. at 204. However, the evidence in Kuruma was
ultimately not excluded, with Lord Goddard stating that “[i]n their Lordships’ opinion the
test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to
the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the
evidence was obtained.” Id. at 203.
26. See Issacharov [2006] § 55 (entitled “Models for the Exclusion of Illegally
Obtained Evidence: A Comparative View”).
27. Id.
28. The characterization of the American exclusionary rule as focused solely on
deterrence is itself highly questionable; at the very least, the matter has been under debate
within the U.S. Supreme Court and there is strong evidence that other factors have been
considered as well. Justice Clark’s majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
cited judicial integrity as one of the rationales behind the exclusionary rule. He quoted with
agreement the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead, stating, “Our government
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citing
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). A similar
view was expressed by Justice Brennan in 1984:
Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally
has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that
the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the
initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary
becomes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the
Amendment.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
The role of deterrence in excluding evidence can be tied to a broader question of whether
exclusion is a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved or an outside safeguard designed
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role in protecting the reputation of the judicial system and the fairness of the
process. 29 According to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
evidence should be excluded if its admission would “bring the administration
of justice into disrepute.” 30 In England evidence can be excluded if it will have
“such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought
not to admit it.” 31
The Israeli Supreme Court went on to distinguish between backwardlooking remedies, meant to “erase” the damage caused by the illegal action, and
forward-looking remedies aimed at avoiding future injustice caused by
admitting such evidence against the defendant at trial. 32 The former was
attributed to the American approach and the latter to the other legal systems
cited. 33 From these two distinctions flowed a third: automatic exclusion as
opposed to discretionary exclusion, with the Court choosing the latter as the
most appropriate model for the Israeli legal system. 34
The Court illustrated three groups of considerations that might bear on a
trial judge’s decision to exercise her discretion to exclude evidence. 35 The first
group dealt with the nature and severity of the illegal act itself. The trial judge
could consider whether the illegal act was marginal and technical or
fundamental; whether it was intentional; whether extenuating circumstances
could justify the police behavior (for example, whether the police acted to
prevent evidence destruction); and whether there was a ready way to obtain the
evidence legally, a factor that weighs toward exclusion. Finally, the trial judge
may consider whether the police would have obtained the evidence had it not
been for the use of illegal means. 36
The second group of considerations addressed credibility; the Court
examined the influence that the illegal means might have had upon the
reliability of the evidence obtained, distinguishing primarily between
testimonial and physical evidence. 37 Finally, the third group of considerations
involved the balancing that courts must conduct between the social advantages

to deter those who might infringe it. The question remains controversial and some have
argued that post-Warren Court decisions have emphasized the role of deterrence rather than
other competing considerations. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION 544-46 (3d ed. 2002). Nevertheless, as illustrated by
Justice Brennan’s opinion, some post-Warren Court rulings have underscored other policy
considerations such as judicial integrity and noncomplicity in unlawful interrogation.
29. Issacharov [2006] §§ 57-59.
30. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
11, § 24(2) (U.K.).
31. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.).
32. Issacharov [2006] § 55.
33. Id. § 56-59.
34. Id. § 60.
35. Id. §§ 69-74.
36. Id. § 70.
37. Id. § 71.
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and disadvantages of excluding the evidence—the more severe the crime and
the more central the evidence in securing a conviction, the less likely exclusion
would be. 38
A. Issacharov and Meiri: Has Anything Really Changed?
Issacharov was described by the Israeli Supreme Court as a significant
departure from previous precedents and particularly from the doctrine
established in 1978 in Meiri v. Israel. 39 Under Meiri, 40 courts could not
exclude illegally obtained evidence, but could decide to give the evidence little
or no weight. Like Issacharov, Meiri also addressed the infringement of the
right to counsel. The police failed to summon Moshe Meiri’s attorney to a
photo identification. Although the court in Meiri deemed the witness’s
identification of the defendant to be completely reliable, the Supreme Court
decided to give the evidence no weight whatsoever. The Court ruled that police
failure to comply with the law could reduce the weight of the evidence
obtained, and may even result (as it did in this instance) in awarding such
evidence no weight at all, leading to the acquittal of the defendant. Meiri came
after a series of incidents in which the police had failed to abide by legal
guidelines and paid no heed to the Supreme Court’s repeated warnings. 41
Reviewing the ruling in Meiri, one must wonder: is Issacharov a
significant departure, or is the difference primarily semantic? In Israel’s unitary
judiciary, in which judges engage in both fact-finding and legal determinations,
the differences between the Meiri doctrine of “admissible, but without weight”
and Issacharov’s “discretionary exclusion” are all but self-evident. Let us first
consider how alike the two doctrines are in practice: under both doctrines, legal
determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence are made by the same
person who engages in fact-finding—the judge. The judge examines the
content of the contested evidence before determining its fate; under neither
doctrine is exclusion automatic even if the court determines that the rights of
the defendant have been infringed; that is, under both doctrines, the trial judge
retains discretion over the fate of the evidence. What, then, are the differences
between excluding evidence and giving it no weight in a unitary court
system? 42
38. Id. § 72.
39. Id. §§ 39, 42-43, 54.
40. CrimA 559/77 Meiri v. Israel [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 180.
41. See CrimA 260/78 Suliman v. Attorney General [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 207; CrimA
559/77 Meiri v. State [1978] IsrSC 32(2) at 182; CrimA 161/77 Zuher v. State [1978] IsrSC
32(1) 327.
42. For a discussion of why the term “exclusion” is itself problematic in unitary courts,
see DAMASKA, supra note 15, at 47-52. Damaska points out that in unitary systems the fact
finder cannot entirely erase the impressions of inadmissible evidence to which he has been
exposed. Therefore, exclusion in such contexts is limited; the most that can be expected is
that the judge not base a written opinion upon inadmissible evidence. Id. Damaska’s
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The Supreme Court in Issacharov encountered some difficulty when
attempting to distinguish the existing doctrine from the new one. 43 The Court
gave no hint of the practical consequences of the change in doctrine. It
conceded that the two doctrines would often lead to the same result, yet
neglected to provide a single example in which the two approaches would lead
to different outcomes. 44 Moreover, before Issacharov was decided, some legal
scholars had indicated that the two doctrines were de facto commensurate and
would produce identical results. 45 In fact, in Issacharov itself the two doctrines
could have led to the same outcome, and Private Issacharov could have been
acquitted of marijuana possession and use even under the Meiri doctrine: the
Court could have given no weight to his confession to prior use and to the urine
sample he provided, leaving the prosecution with too little evidence to prove
the crimes. 46
B. Distinguishing Admissibility from Weight in Bifurcated and Unitary Courts
Although the distinction between admissibility and weight had no
significance in the Israeli context, it does carry great importance in bifurcated
courts. In most common law systems cited by the Israeli Supreme Court in
Issacharov, the distinction between a question of admissibility and one of
weight was critical. It determined who decided the fate of the evidence—judge
or jury. Whereas admissibility is determined by the judge, weight is the
province of juries; if a judge excludes the evidence, the jury can no longer
determine its weight. In motions to suppress illegally obtained evidence, the
result of exclusion is that the jury never has access to the questionable evidence
at all. In England and the United States, suppression motions are held,
whenever possible, outside the hearing of the jury, which never even learns of
the existence of such evidence. 47 In the United States, these hearings are often
observations are equally applicable to bench trials in common law jurisdictions as they are in
unitary civil law systems. However, the question of whether exclusion can be effectively
achieved in a unitary court is beyond the scope of this Note.
43. See Issacharov [2006] § 74.
44. Id.
45. See Harnon, supra note 22, at 1021.
46. Furthermore, in at least one sense Issacharov is narrower than Meiri and is
contained in the Meiri doctrine. Issacharov gives the court the possibility to admit or exclude
evidence, in an all-or-nothing manner, whereas Meiri allowed the court a broader range of
sanctions if it found that illegal means were used: it can admit the evidence but reduce its
weight. See CrimA 559/77 Meiri v. State [1978] IsrSC 32(2) at 182. However, it appears that
Issacharov did not reverse Meiri. Therefore, courts maintain their power to discount the
weight of illegally obtained evidence; it appears that the Court added the possibility to
“exclude.”
47. See FED. R. EVID. 104(c) (“Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall
be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so
requests.”). Mueller and Kirkpatrick observe that “[d]efense requests to exclude confessions
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conducted before a jury is even impaneled. 48 Hence, in bifurcated jury settings,
the distinction between admissibility and weight is significant. In Israel, which
does not employ juries, the distinction does not carry similar ramifications.
Although Israel does not employ juries, there are a number of ways in
which the Israeli Supreme Court could have given substance to the new
doctrine of “exclusion” as distinguished from the old doctrine of “no weight” in
a unitary system. First, in an effort to maintain the fact finder’s ignorance
toward the excluded evidence, the Court could have ordered that a different
judge rule on preliminary motions to suppress evidence on constitutional
grounds. 49 Another possibility would be to limit motions to suppress to proving
the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the evidence (e.g., the behavior
of the police interrogators when obtaining the confession), without examining
the substance of the contested evidence. Some courts in the United States have
followed such practice in bench trials when determining the voluntariness of a
confession. 50 But as we have seen, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the
decision to exclude must be based in part upon the effect of the illegal means
on the content of the evidence obtained; to make such a determination, the
court must be allowed to examine the content of the evidence as well and
cannot satisfy itself by examining only the means through which it was
obtained.
The Court also could have given substance to the distinction between
exclusion and weight by ruling that certain facts, such as a failure to warn the
as involuntary, and motions to suppress evidence on other constitutional grounds, are
typically made before trial . . . and resolved before a jury is impaneled.” 1 CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1:37 (3d ed. 2007). In England
these determinations are also typically conducted in the absence of the jury. Furthermore, in
England, if a judge has admitted such evidence and later realizes that it should not have
admitted it, this can be sufficient grounds to dismiss the jury. See ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL
PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 1578, 1603, 1606 (P.J. Richardson ed., 2005).
48. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47.
49. As a matter of practice, Israeli courts do so in pretrial arrests: the judge who
considers the grounds for pretrial custody cannot rule on guilt, since some of the evidence to
which he is exposed (e.g., hearsay, prior convictions) are inadmissible at trial. See HAYA
SANDBERG, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 98 (1996).
50. See 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at § 1:37. The authors note that
“[t]here is strength in this view, since confessions can be unusually potent in persuasive
force and they merit special attention.” On the other hand they note that “judges inevitably
hear much evidence ultimately excluded, and the presence of constitutional issues does not
itself mean they cannot perform in a dual capacity, and some cases have been less concerned
on this point.” As I point out later, the former approach was adopted in Israel during the
1960s in the Yassin case. Generally, such a procedure is applied in Israel when determining
whether a confession is free and voluntary: Israeli courts conduct a “trial within a trial” to
determine the matter and, at least historically, were not supposed to examine the substance of
the confession when ruling on its admissibility. Nevertheless, court practice has evolved over
the years and courts today are more likely to examine the content of the confession during
the trial within a trial when ruling on its voluntary nature, in a manner that may “poison the
judges mind.” See George C. Gebbie & Dan Bein, ‘Trial Within A Trial’ in Scotland and
Israel, 10 EUR. J. CRIME CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 253, 264 (2002).
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defendant of his rights, would result in automatic exclusion. 51 This constraint
on judicial discretion would have moved the doctrine a step away from Meiri. 52
However, the Court in Issacharov preferred to retain full discretion, providing
only general (and often vague and counterintuitive) guidelines as to what
circumstances would lead to inadmissibility.
II. LOST IN TRANSLATION: ADMISSIBILITY IN ISRAELI COURTS THROUGHOUT
THE DECADES
From a practical standpoint, the Issacharov decision introduced little
innovation into the Israeli legal system. Why, then, was the Supreme Court so
convinced it was spearheading a revolution? As we shall see in this Part,
Issacharov was the result of an ongoing attempt within the Israeli judiciary to
translate the legal terms admissibility and weight from common law
jurisdictions into Israeli law. The Court proceeded on the assumption that these
terms could convey the same meaning in Israel that they held in the many
common law jurisdictions that were cited in Issacharov. In law much like in
literature, however, literal translations do not always capture the essence of the
original; concepts and doctrines are often lost in translation. As Pierre Legrand
has warned, “legal transplants” often emphasize the bare propositional
statement borrowed from another jurisdiction, while overlooking the true and
deeper meaning of the adopted rule. 53 Mirjan Damaska and others have pointed
out the particular perils of legal transplants in the field of evidence. 54 The
history leading up to Issacharov illustrates these dangers and the fraught task of
translating evidentiary rules and terminology from one legal system into
another.
Therefore, this Part is dedicated to analyzing Israel’s attempts throughout
the decades to translate evidentiary rules from other legal systems. It surveys
four stages of development in the meaning of admissibility in relation to the
exclusionary rule: the British Mandate era, when admissibility and weight
connoted the distinction between law and fact respectively; the 1960s, when
admissibility was regarded as a separate procedural stage in the examination of
evidence; the 1970s, when admissibility came to connote rigid rules as opposed
to the more discretionary weight standards; and finally, admissibility as a more
51. This is the case in Germany. For example, evidence obtained through brutality or
deceit must be excluded, whereas other violations leave the courts with discretion whether to
exclude the evidence or not. See Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1034 (1983); Harnon, supra note 22, at 1007.
52. My purpose is not to advocate such an automatic exclusionary rule; rather, this
possibility is presented to demonstrate how in the Israeli institutional context the term
“exclusion” could have been distinguished from the Meiri “no weight” doctrine.
53. See Legrand, supra note 11, at 114-15.
54. See Damaska, supra note 13. For a discussion of the difficulties of comparative
procedure, see John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United
States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 551-54 (1995).
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severe sanction (when compared to weight) for dealing with police misconduct
and abuse. 55 After analyzing the complex meaning of admissibility in Israeli
law, I will discuss how these shifting meanings, coupled with developments
abroad, helped shape the Issacharov decision and how they led the Court to
conclude that it was revolutionizing Israeli evidence law.
A. The British Mandate over Palestine: Admissibility as a Legal Standard
The leading precedent concerning exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
during the British Mandate over Palestine was the 1942 Berkovitz case, in
which the Court excluded the confessions of four defendants because the police
had not properly warned them of their right to remain silent. 56 The four
defendants, all constables, were charged with theft of tin from the Royal
Engineers’ Store Base Depot. After hearing the initial account of the first
defendant, the police interrogator informed him that it would be “better for him
to tell the truth,” 57 while informing all four defendants that they “are entitled to
give evidence before [him] or in Court.” 58 In the Supreme Court’s opinion,
both actions infringed the defendants’ right to silence. 59 The Court held that
although the confessions seemed reliable, “[t]he question as to whether or not a
confession is true is utterly immaterial when considering its admissibility” 60
and excluded them.
One of the Supreme Court’s main dilemmas in Berkovitz was how to apply
jury-based rules of admissibility in a judicial system that did not employ juries.
The Court explained that in England, when deciding the admissibility of a
confession alleged to have been obtained illegally, the judge engaged in the
finding of both fact and law; he determined the circumstances under which the
confession was obtained (fact) and whether it should still be regarded as “free
and voluntary” (law). If the evidence was admitted, the jury then decided what
weight to attach to it, depending on whether the jury found the evidence
reliable. 61
However, in Palestine, where there were no juries, the judge would rule on
all matters, including the weight of the confession. Therefore, different
55. Anglo-American law includes many of these distinctions between admissibility
and weight: the distinction between law and fact, the separate procedural and sequential
determination of the two, and the maintaining of the fact finder’s ignorance of the content of
evidence deemed inadmissible. However, the Israeli definition of admissibility has placed
emphasis on particular distinctions at different periods, thus leading to inconsistencies.
56. CrimA 155/42 Berkovitz v. Attorney General [1942] 9 Palestine L. Reps. 654.
57. Id. at 659.
58. Id. at 661.
59. Interestingly, the Court excluded the evidence even though the defendants were
constables, who presumably would have been aware of their right to remain silent.
60. CrimA 155/42 Berkovitz v. Attorney General [1942] 9 Palestine L. Reps. at 661
(emphasis added).
61. Id. at 657-58.
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distinctions between admissibility and weight had to be drawn. The Court ruled
that “admissibility” must no longer include the factual inquiry into the
circumstances of the interrogation (as it would in England), but should be
strictly a question of the legal standard applied. 62 For example, if it had been
established that the defendant was not warned of his right to remain silent (a
factual determination), the admissibility question would be whether from a
legal standpoint such failure to warn should trigger exclusion of the evidence.
As a consequence, whereas an appellate court would be unlikely to
determine the weight of a confession or the factual circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, “admissibility is eminently a matter with which a Court of
Appeal not only may, but should interfere if, in their opinion, the wrong tests
have been applied.” 63 As we can see, the term admissibility was defined by the
Court narrowly, as the legal standard applied to exclusion of evidence, while all
factual determinations, both those pertaining to the circumstances of the
interrogation and those concerning the reliability of the evidence, were beyond
the scope of admissibility. During this period, admissibility in Palestine was
only part of the admissibility test applied in England.
B. The 1960s: Admissibility as a Separate Procedural Step
In many regards, the first years of Israeli statehood signify an effort to
break away from the past, to reevaluate the laws implemented by the British,
and to reexamine their applicability and desirability in the newly established
state. The treatment of the exclusionary rule by Israeli courts during these years
fits this broader trend: courts viewed the British rules as too rigid, leading to
exclusion of perfectly reliable evidence due to “mere technicalities” such as a
failure to warn the defendant of his right to silence. 64 During these early years
of statehood, therefore, the courts raised the bar for exclusion and ruled that
evidence would be excluded only if there were doubts concerning its
reliability—an assessment that turned primarily upon a factual determination
that the illegal means used to obtain the confession may have prompted an
innocent defendant to confess. It grew unclear what role legal determinations
would have in admissibility rulings, as reliability became the only relevant
factor. Appellate courts now had little role in second-guessing the treatment of
illegally obtained evidence by lower courts, since the determination was

62. Id. at 655, 657-58.
63. Id. at 658.
64. See, e.g., CrimA 20/49 Hadi v. Attorney General [1949] IsrSC 3(1) 13. The Court
discusses at great length the fact that the Supreme Court of Palestine was even stricter than
English courts were at the time in sanctioning failures to secure the rights of defendants.
According to the Israeli Supreme Court in Hadi, in England there was an ongoing debate
about the exclusion of such evidence and in many cases illegally obtained evidence was
nevertheless admitted, whereas British judges in Palestine excluded evidence far more
readily.
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primarily one of fact and not law.
In an attempt to reintroduce a clear legal criterion for determining
admissibility, in 1963 the Supreme Court redefined the boundaries between
admissibility and weight. In Yassin v. Attorney General the Court created a
two-prong, two-step test for illegally obtained evidence. 65 First, admissibility
and weight were crafted to correspond with objective and subjective categories
respectively: to determine admissibility, a court asked whether the means used
to obtain the evidence could in theory lead an innocent person to confess to a
crime he did not commit. This question turned on both factual findings (what
means were used by the police in that case) and a legal determination (would
such means lead a “reasonable” defendant to confess to a crime he did not
commit). The second stage of the test, which determined the weight of the
evidence, was subjective: did the illegal means lead the specific defendant to
confess? 66 Answering this question depended primarily on factual findings and
the court’s impression of the particular defendant.67 It was this subjective
component of the test that went to the credibility of the evidence and would
therefore affect its weight. 68
Under Yassin admissibility and weight were determined sequentially and
based on different data: the court would have to determine the admissibility of
evidence without looking at its content. Only after determining that the
evidence was admissible could the court look at the evidence itself and
determine what weight should be attached to it. 69 In creating this two-step
process, the Supreme Court appeared to be trying to approximate the judge-jury
distinction, by “bifurcating” the judge (or more precisely, the judicial process),
in an attempt to leave the judge ignorant of the content of the evidence unless
he found it to be admissible. 70
65. See CrimA 307/60 Yassin v. Attorney General [1963] IsrSC 17(3) 1541, 1555-56.
66. Id. at 1555-56.
67. See, e.g., CrimA 115/82 Muadi v. Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 197. For a discussion
of how the particular characteristics of the accused may affect the voluntariness of a
confession, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 608-09 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
68. It is notable that this test is applied primarily, if not exclusively, to testimonial
evidence, as opposed to real, or physical evidence.
69. CrimA 307/60 Yassin v. Attorney General [1963] IsrSC 17(3) 1541, 1556.
70. Such bifurcation is suggested by some evidence scholars in the United States, and
some courts have tried to maintain this separation in bench trials. See 1 MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at § 1:37 (“In bench-tried criminal cases, the separate and
reliable finding required by Jackson means that the court should determine voluntariness
before taking evidence on the merits.”). But while some courts have followed this practice,
others do not make such a distinction. Id. § 1:37 nn.15-16. Interestingly, this bifurcation of
the proceedings was created by Justice Simon Agranat, a graduate of the University of
Chicago, who immigrated to Israel in 1930. Agranat’s bifurcation mechanism solved one
problem (to some degree), but it created another: Although the judge would not be unfairly
biased by the content of the confession, she would also be denied the possibility of
considering the substance of the evidence when ruling on its exclusion, which would be
available to her English or American counterpart. The judge was to impose upon herself
technical restrictions that were largely absent in bench trials in “classic” common law
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Under the Yassin test, admissibility and weight no longer corresponded
neatly to the law/fact division established during the Mandate period. Instead
admissibility became entangled in fact-finding about the means by which the
evidence was obtained, as was true in jury trials. Yassin therefore represented a
new attempt to translate the doctrine of admissibility into Israel’s unitary
courts.
C. Meiri: Admissibility as Rigidity
The years after Yassin coincided with a broader trend in Israeli evidence
law that extended beyond illegally obtained evidence: a move away from strict
rules of admissibility towards more flexible standards concerning the weight of
evidence. 71 Israeli judges and legal scholars argued that rules of admissibility
were conceptually alien to the Israeli legal system: they were devised primarily
for juries, to shelter lay fact finders from exposure to unreliable evidence and
data that would unfairly bias their decision. 72 Israeli judges voiced frustration
with inherited British law, marked by rigid admissibility rules that often forced
judges to disregard reliable and relevant evidence. 73
Since professional judges thought themselves less susceptible to the perils
of over-weighing questionable evidence, many believed that in Israel rules of
admissibility should give way to greater judicial discretion concerning the
weight of problematic evidence. 74 More flexible standards of weight would
enable judges to rule on a case-by-case basis, allowing the court to admit
evidence that possessed probative value, even if it did not strictly comply with
the common law rules of admissibility. Whereas admissibility was a binary
“all-or-nothing” system, weight gave courts greater flexibility in dealing with
jurisdictions. Furthermore, Agranat’s bifurcation was not complete: even if the judge would
not be aware of the content, she would still be aware that the defendant had confessed, for
example.
71. See, e.g., Eliahu Harnon, Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 24 ISR. L. REV. 592,
612-13 (1990). For a discussion of a similar move away from rules of admissibility toward
“free proof” in other Anglo-American jurisdictions, see ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF
EVIDENCE LAW 108-09 (2005).
72. For an illustration of such concerns in the United States, see, for example, FED. R.
EVID. 403.
73. See, e.g., Uri Struzman, The Naked King or the Dominance of Juries in Israeli
Courts, 13 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 175 (1988). Struzman, a judge at the Tel Aviv District
Court, describes how admissibility rules often lead to the acquittal of defendants known to
be guilty. He writes how “once again the rules of evidence have defeated the pursuit of
justice.” Struzman then wonders why “there is still a sacredness about laws imported from a
foreign land” and asks why “the dust is not removed from these principles . . . to determine
whether their [foundations] are solid or whether they have grown unstable when moved from
their native England [to Israel].” Id. at 178. Struzman makes a series of recommendations for
reform concerning, for example, out-of-court statements and the admissibility of accomplice
testimony.
74. See Emanuel Gross, Should Israel Adopt a Constitutional Exclusionary Rule?, 30
MISHPATIM 145, 149 (1998).
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contested evidence. Admissibility came to connote rigidity and technicality, as
opposed to the more discretionary nature of weight.
The process of shifting away from rules of admissibility towards standards
of weight affected the examination of illegally obtained evidence as well, and
appears to have led the Court in Meiri away from viewing its treatment of the
evidence (by giving it no weight) as “exclusion.” 75 Rather, the Court regarded
Meiri to be a question of weight, bringing the exclusionary rule into line with
the broader shift in Israel away from admissibility rules. 76
But the formulation of Meiri as pertaining to weight rather than
admissibility presented many complications that would play out in the years
leading up to Issacharov. First, Meiri eroded the distinction between unreliable
and illegally obtained evidence. It discounted both categories of evidence in a
similar fashion, even though the policies underlying their treatment were quite
different. Whereas unreliable evidence is deemed inadmissible because it
undermines the accuracy of (jury) decisions, illegally obtained evidence, which
is often highly reliable, is excluded to vindicate defendants’ rights. Therefore,
despite Israel’s employment of professional fact finders (judges rather than
juries), in the debate over the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence Israel
was no different than any jury system. The general aversion in Israel towards
rigid admissibility rules, which often deemed reliable evidence inadmissible,
was irrelevant to the debate concerning the exclusion of illegally obtained
75. This discourse infiltrated the exclusionary rule debate despite the important
differences between the two kinds of admissibility: exclusion of illegally obtained evidence,
as a legal question, is independent of the reliability of the evidence; it had to do with the
rights of the defendant. See Andrew Choo & Susan Nash, Improperly Obtained Evidence in
the Commonwealth: Lessons for England and Wales, 11 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 77
(2007). In fact, some scholars have argued that the exclusionary rule has been improperly
categorized as a rule of evidence, even though its “design and operation are evidence
related,” since such exclusion is motivated by social goals that are not aimed solely toward
fact-finding. See STEIN, supra note 71, at 25-26. Therefore, the decision of an Israeli judge to
exclude illegally obtained evidence would be no different from that of a judge in any other
common law jurisdiction. In any event, this improper analogy led to the formulation of Meiri
as a rule of weight, not admissibility, thus emphasizing the courts’ discretion on the matter.
76. Furthermore, in formulating Meiri and subsequent decisions, the Israeli Supreme
Court wished to set itself apart from courts in the United States in the post-Miranda era.
From an Israeli perspective, American courts seemed to reach unjust results under Miranda
by excluding crucial evidence due to the slightest police misconduct. Yet at the same time,
the American strict exclusion of evidence appeared to be ineffective in deterring the police
from acting abusively. See, for example, CrimA 369/78 Abu Medijam v. State [1979] IsrSC
33(3) 383, in which H. Cohn’s Supreme Court decision cited and discussed Dallin H. Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970), to
question the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in deterring the police. Categorizing Meiri
as a question of weight emphasized two aspects of the Court’s flexible and discretionary
position when treating illegally obtained evidence. First, the court’s discretion in
determining what kinds of illegality would affect weight. Second, framing Meiri as a
question of weight provided Israeli courts with a broad range of sanctions, beyond the binary
options of admitting or excluding evidence; they could admit the evidence and give it little
weight or no weight at all.
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evidence. 77
Second, weight was now determined not only by fact (i.e., the reliability of
the evidence), but also by law: the evidence in Meiri had no weight as a matter
of law, as a way of protecting the defendant’s rights, not due to doubts
concerning the evidence’s reliability. 78 Defining weight as a question of law
stood in sharp contrast to the Court’s previous approach: under the 1942
Berkovitz distinction between admissibility and weight, legal considerations
were at the heart of the admissibility test, while the weight test was solely
factual. 79
Third, when stating that illegal means could “only” affect the weight of the
evidence but not lead to its exclusion, the Court created the impression that
there was a concrete difference between the two even in a unitary system and
that exclusion was a more severe sanction.
D. Developments Abroad: The 1980s and 1990s
To understand what occurred between Meiri and Issacharov, our analysis
must leave Israel and examine developments in Canada, South Africa, and most
importantly England. In 1984 England enacted the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE). Section 78 of PACE established a statutory
discretionary exclusionary rule, providing that a court “may refuse to allow
evidence . . . if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on
the fairness of proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” 80 One might
notice the law’s emphasis on the court’s power to deem the evidence
inadmissible. After Meiri, looking at the English doctrine from an Israeli
vantage point made the two doctrines seem fundamentally dissimilar: whereas
in England such evidence could be excluded, in Israel, under Meiri, it could
“only” be given no weight. 81
77. As discussed above, the analogy between the two kinds of inadmissibility might
stem from Israeli perceptions of the American legal system, which appeared to exclude
evidence due to the slightest infringement of the defendant’s rights. See supra note 76.
78. As discussed earlier, admissibility was understood to be both a factual and legal
determination by the judge in a jury trial, but weight was viewed as exclusively factual.
79. CrimA 155/42 Berkovitz v. Attorney General [1942] 9 Palestine L. Reps. 654,
657-658.
80. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.). Since this Note is
not concerned with the reform introduced by Section 78(1) but rather with how it was
perceived in Israel, I do not address this matter further. The formulation of Section 78 and its
intended effects are discussed in DAVID WOLCHOVER, THE EXCLUSION OF IMPROPERLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE 207-14 (1986). After its enactment it was debated to what degree
Section 78(1) had in fact modified the common law on this issue. See C.J.W. Allen,
Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence Under Section 78(1) of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 80 (1990).
81. A separate yet highly relevant query is how English courts have construed Section
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Like the PACE in England, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
of 1982 established that “where . . . a court concludes that evidence was
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” 82 Lastly, in 1996 South
Africa adopted its constitution, in which it determined that “[e]vidence
obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be
excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or
otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.” 83 All three
provisions speak of the exclusion of evidence. Furthermore, in both Canada and
South Africa the provision was a constitutional one, as it had been construed to
be in the United States.
Israeli courts and scholars looking at developments abroad got the
unwarranted impression that Israel was falling behind other enlightened
democracies: whereas foreign courts were allowed to exclude illegally obtained
evidence, Israeli courts under the Meiri doctrine could “only” diminish its
weight, which seemed a less extreme sanction and less protective of
defendants’ rights, even though the Israeli Supreme Court had clearly
demonstrated in Meiri that it could give such evidence no weight at all.
Furthermore, in the United States, 84 Canada, South Africa, and even England 85
the exclusionary rule had become a constitutional issue, whereas in Israel it had
been viewed as merely a procedural matter, not associated with a supreme law.
When in 1992, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was passed, leading
Chief Justice Barak to proclaim the beginning of a “Constitutional

78(1) and under what circumstances they have in fact excluded evidence. Scholars have
recently argued that in England the section has been narrowly applied, especially concerning
physical evidence, due to a restrictive interpretation of the term “fair trial.” See Choo &
Nash, supra note 75, at 78-79. This should have perhaps interested the Israeli Supreme Court
when citing foreign authority on the matter.
82. See Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch. 11, § 24(2) (U.K.).
83. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. II (Bill of Rights), § 35(5). South Africa was the only
nonjury jurisdiction mentioned in Issacharov. Perhaps focusing more closely on the South
African model would have indicated to the Israeli Supreme Court that there was little
practical difference between the Meiri doctrine and the South African approach.
84. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (“There are in these cases of this
Court some passing references to the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and
unequivocal language of Weeks—and its later paraphrase in Wolf—to the effect that the
Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains clearly undisturbed.”).
85. See A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71
(U.K.), § 51 (“It trivialises the issue before the House to treat it as an argument about the law
of evidence. The issue is one of constitutional principle, whether evidence obtained by
torturing another human being may lawfully be admitted against a party to proceedings in a
British court, irrespective of where, or by whom, or on whose authority the torture was
inflicted.”).
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Revolution,” 86 the time seemed ripe to align Israeli law with that of other
common law jurisdictions by giving courts the power to exclude illegally
obtained evidence based on a quasi-constitutional provision.
And indeed a number of law journal articles from the mid 1990s onward
advocated the recognition of a constitutional exclusionary rule in Israel, citing
both the Constitutional Revolution and the new developments abroad as
reasons for change. 87 Chief Justice Barak himself referred in a 1996 article to
the influence of the Constitutional Revolution on criminal procedure, indicating
that one of the possible effects could be the authority of courts to exclude
illegally obtained evidence. 88 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court indicated
its eagerness for reform in its written opinions. In a series of decisions from
1996 onward, the Court hinted strongly that it was prepared to recognize such a
constitutional exclusionary rule, but was awaiting an appropriate case. 89
Issacharov, a seemingly routine matter submitted for review in 1998, provided
exactly such an opportunity to complete the Revolution. But little attention was
given to how a new exclusionary rule would differ in practice from the Meiri
doctrine. Only one scholar noted the de facto resemblance in the operation of
the two rules. The differences were mostly declarative and symbolic. 90
E. The Exclusionary Rule and Rejection of Legal Transplants
Israel’s difficulty in satisfactorily translating the common law’s
admissibility and weight distinction and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
developments abroad illustrate some of the inherent challenges which have led
Pierre Legrand to conclude that legal transplants are “impossible.” Legrand has
emphasized that legal rules are more than mere propositional statements and go
beyond the words that constitute them. They consist of the meaning given to
them and by their operation in practice, which in turn are products of history,
culture, language, politics, sociology, anthropology and economics. To import a
single line of text without its broader context, he says, is both superficial and

86. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human Rights, 1
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 9 (1992); see also CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal
Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221, 342, 447.
87. See Gross, supra note 74; Harnon, supra note 22.
88. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of Israeli Law: The Basic Laws on
Human Rights and Criminal Law, 13 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 5, 24 (1996). Barak also discussed
the possible effects of the Constitutional Revolution on the presumption of innocence and
the right to silence. He further elaborated on these ideas in an English-language article
written in 1997. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as
a Result of the Basic Laws and Its Effects on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law, 31
ISR. L. REV. 3, 19 (1997).
89. See, e.g., CrimA 2180/02 Kassem v. State [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 642, 654; CrimA
5203/98 Hasson v. Israel, [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 274, 283, § 7.
90. See Harnon, supra note 22, at 1021.
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misleading. 91
Transplanting the exclusionary rule to Israel largely illustrates Legrand’s
theory. The Issacharov Court sought to import the English rule, but focused too
narrowly on the linguistic aspects of the term “admissibility,” rather than what
it meant. Although Israeli law, and the law of Palestine before it, had
incorporated the terminology of admissibility and weight into Israeli evidence
law, these terms and the distinction between them had developed a distinctly
Israeli character, which diverged from their meaning in English, Canadian, or
American law. These terms could not be identical because of the structural
differences discussed in this Note (the relation between admissibility and
bifurcation), but also because of broader cultural and historical factors that have
affected application of the exclusionary rule and the goals it seeks to achieve. 92
The distinctly Israeli flavor of the terms admissibility and weight had
colored the Israeli perception of developments abroad. Rather than examining
the significance of PACE from an English perspective, Israeli jurists focused on
what changes Section 78 of PACE would have introduced had it been passed in
Israel. They concentrated on what were regarded to be unifying characteristics,
assuming that admissibility connoted the same thing in both countries.
However, obliterating the requisite distance between self and other led to a
questionable understanding of what “exclusion” would change in the Israeli
legal system and ultimately to the Issacharov ruling. The reason for this strong
focus on developments abroad while largely overlooking the implications upon
the local legal system will be addressed in the following Part.
III. THE ANGLICIZATION OF ISRAELI EVIDENCE LAW
Comparative law played a crucial role in the formulation of Issacharov.
91. Legrand, supra note 11, at 119.
92. For example, when determining the proper objectives of the exclusionary rule in
Israel, it is insufficient to note that American courts have focused on police deterrence
whereas other countries have considered the fairness of trial and the potential disrepute to the
judiciary to be relevant factors. In evaluating these competing objectives one must
determine, for example, whether the crime rate in Israel is comparable to that of the United
States. One must further determine whether excluding evidence can in fact deter Israeli
police from abusive conduct, without relying solely on empirical data from the United States
that supports or questions the efficacy of such measures. Similarly, evaluating the disrepute
caused to the judiciary by admitting such evidence depends on existing perceptions of the
judicial system as well as concepts of what constitutes a fair trial. These determinations may
be affected by history, religion, and culture, and they may even differ between populations
within a single jurisdiction. The perception of the judiciary in post-Apartheid South Africa,
for example, may be quite different than in Canada. Within South Africa, the white
population may perceive the judiciary differently than the black population. Similarly, courts
in England might exclude evidence of terrorist activity in a criminal trial since it was
obtained through torture, because its admission may cause disrepute or affect the fairness of
trial, whereas Israeli courts may conclude that excluding such evidence and acquitting a selfproclaimed terrorist might result in disrepute within Israeli society. As we can see,
transplanting legal formulae tells us little about their proper application.
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Developments abroad seem to have sparked the ruling; the sense that Israel was
falling out of line with a group of nations with which it identified from a legal
standpoint meant that action had to be taken. The Issacharov Court drew on
constitutions, legislation, and precedents from what it repeatedly referred to as
“legal systems similar to our own”—namely those of England, the United
States, Canada, South Africa, and Australia—to explain why reform was
crucial and why courts had both the authority and responsibility to initiate it. 93
One of the striking features of the Supreme Court’s comparative analysis in
Issacharov is its reliance solely upon common law jurisdictions. 94 The Court
completely overlooked the experience of Continental European courts, though
many civil law jurisdictions had recently adopted versions of the exclusionary
rule. 95 Pointing out that even civil law countries, which do not typically bar
evidence, had devised an exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence
would have strengthened the Israeli Supreme Court’s claim of an international
consensus. Yet the Court ignored this trend.
The experience of Continental European jurisdictions might have been
more pertinent to Israel than that of common law countries. After all, Israel’s
unitary trial courts had struggled to translate and incorporate common law
admissibility rules, which assume bifurcation. Continental systems, typically
unitary, have generally recognized their inability to regulate the exposure of
fact finders to questionable evidence. 96 They therefore have not focused on
“admissibility” in the sense of regulating input of contested information. Rather
they have concentrated on regulating their output and ensuring that written

93. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet
published), §§ 40, 50, 55, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/
98051210.n21.pdf.
94. The one exception is the brief mention of the European Convention of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Issacharov. Id. § 58. However, the Court
only noted that the European Court of Human Rights has not mandated exclusion and has
approved of England’s discretional exclusion when admission would adversely affect the
fairness of the trial.
95. Courts in Germany, Italy, and France have all adopted some version of the
exclusionary rule. See Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to
Criminal Procedure Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 171 (1993); Walter Pakter, Exclusionary
Rules in France, Germany and Italy, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1985). However,
in the absence of juries these countries do not make the distinction between admissibility and
weight. In France for example, the result of a decision to exclude is that the evidence is
removed from the dossier and may not be referred to by the parties or by the judge in his
decision. See Richard Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 14, 48-49 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996). Similarly, in Germany the fact
finder is exposed to the contested evidence but asked not to rely upon it in his written
decision. See Christian Fahl, The Guarantee of Defense Counsel and the Exclusionary Rules
on Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in Germany, 8 GER. L.J., Nov. 1, 2007,
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol08No11/PDF_Vol_08_No_11_10531067_Articles_Fahl.pdf.
96. See Fahl, supra note 95.
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decisions do not rely on excluded evidence. 97 Had Israel followed such a
model more closely and understood that speaking of “admissibility” in the strict
common law sense is largely meaningless in a unitary system, it could have
avoided some of the confusion between admissibility and weight. It would have
realized that the Meiri doctrine of giving illegally obtained evidence no weight
was commensurate to the model of many Continental systems which prohibit
reliance upon such evidence in a written decision even if it is “admitted.”
In this Part I shall examine why the Israeli Supreme Court relies so heavily
upon the common law despite the incompatibility between the systems. I
explore some of the historical, linguistic, and cultural factors that have shaped
Israel’s strong relationship with the common law. I then try to place these
factors within the broader context of why codes and legal doctrines travel and
what choices of comparative law can teach us about the self-perception and
identity of a legal system. Finally, I consider the perils of self-definition
through comparative law and of uncritical emulation of foreign legal systems.
A. The Empirical Basis
One of the striking attributes of the Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
is the Court’s heavy reliance upon comparative law in its rulings. 98 However,
while the Court often cites decisions from common law jurisdictions, it rarely
cites Continental European decisions, constitutions, or laws. An empirical study
97. Whereas “common law systems seek to regulate the presentation of evidence to the
decision maker, continental systems put emphasis on the regulation of the decision itself and
eventually on the motivation in the (written) decision.” Johanes F. Nijboer, Methods of
Investigation and Exclusion of Evidence: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspective,
in BEWEISVERBOTE IN LÄNDERN DER EU UND VERGLECHBAREN RECHTSORDNUNGEN
[EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WITHIN THE EU AND BEYOND] 39, 40 (1997). In contrast to
Continental systems that are unable to regulate the flow of information to the fact finder due
to lack of bifurcation, common law systems often suffer from an inability to monitor the
motivations of lay fact finders. See DAMASKA, supra note 15, at 48-49. This is because juries
do not produce reasoned decisions. Furthermore, the common law’s reluctance to scrutinize
jury deliberations even in cases of clear jury misconduct, further complicates the task of
ensuring the fairness of the decision. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
Scholars view these factors as reasons for the common law’s strong emphasis upon
regulating the information to which lay fact finders are exposed. See DAMASKA, supra note
15, at 41, 44; FISHER, supra note 17, at 15-16. Damaska explains that since juries do not give
reasons for their decisions, they suffer from a “legitimacy deficit,” which can only be
mitigated by regulating the database to which they are exposed. DAMASKA, supra note 15, at
41, 44.
98. See HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v. Local Council of Macabim-Reut [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 19
(citing Canadian and Australian law in interpreting the right to equality and defining
discrimination); HCJ 73/53 “Kol Ha’am” Co. Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC
7(2) 871 (citing American and English authorities in determining the scope of the freedom of
speech); see also HCJ 316/03 Bakri v. Censorship Council [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249 (citing
American and Australian case law in determining the proper scope of the freedom of
speech); HCJ 4112/99 Adalah v. Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [2002] 56(5) 393 (citing
Canadian law in defining lingual equality).
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conducted in Israel in 1994 that sought to outline the citation patterns of the
Israeli Supreme Court over forty-six years of statehood confirmed a significant
decline in citations of Continental legal systems. By 1994 the Supreme Court
did not cite even a single Continental legal source. 99 However, perhaps
surprisingly, the research also showed that even during the first decades of
statehood, when many of Israel’s leading jurists were immigrants who had been
educated in Continental Europe (primarily Germany), the Supreme Court never
relied heavily on Continental sources. 100 Only 0.5% of citations have been to
Continental sources, and in no year have they exceeded 2%. 101
In contrast, reliance on the common law, primarily English and American
sources, has been far greater. On average, 20.9% of the Israeli Supreme Court’s
citations have been to common law jurisdictions. 102 Reliance upon the
common law peaked in 1952, when as many as 38.1% of citations in published
opinions named common law sources. Of the various common law sources,
American precedents and scholarly work have grown more prominent, claiming
no citations at all in 1948 and 5.1% in 1994. English sources have steadily
declined, falling from 24.4% to only 2.3%. 103 The greater influence of
99. See Yoram Shachar et al., Citation Practices of the Supreme Court: Quantitative
Analyses, 27 MISHPATIM 119, 152 (1996). The decline in the influence of the civil law is not
unique to Israel and has been observed as a general phenomenon extending to other countries
as well. See Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law,
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 200 (1994) (book review).
100. The study does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Israeli judges were not
influenced by European jurisprudence, but it does indicate the formal sources that the judges
regarded as authoritative and what they consciously chose to cite. In an article discussing the
German influences on the Israeli Supreme Court, Salzberger and Oz-Salzberger argue that
although the Court rarely cites German sources, the influence of German thought and
jurisprudence on the early decisions of the Court was profound. They explain that the
Justices may have been reluctant to cite German sources in the years following the
Holocaust. They further note that even in the 1990s, when the new Israeli Criminal Code
was presented to the Knesset, no formal mention was made in the proposal to German law
despite the clear reliance upon the German Code in the formulation of the Israeli law. This
demonstrates, in their opinion, how the German tradition in Israel is very much alive, but
hidden. Eli Salzberger & Fania Oz-Salzberger, The German Heritage of the Israeli Supreme
Court, 21 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 259 (1998). Another possibility is that the typically shorter
opinions of European Courts provide less material from which to quote or cite, making
Anglo-American courts a more attractive source.
101. This peak was reached in 1954. Other years of relative peaks were 1948, 1955,
and 1975, during which the court cited Continental law in only 1.3% of cases. Shachar et al.,
supra note 99.
102. This does not include decisions from the Mandate period, which the authors
characterized as Israeli precedents, even though many of the decisions were rendered by
British colonial judges. See Shachar et al., supra note 99.
103. The fact that a decision has been cited does not mean that it was followed. For
example, in Issacharov the Supreme Court cited American precedents and scholarship, yet
went on to explain why the American model has gone too far in excluding evidence that
should be admitted. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not
yet published), §§ 60-61, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/
98051210.n21.pdf. Nevertheless, even though the United States model had been rejected in
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American law in the post-World War II era has been observed outside Israel as
well. 104 This empirical project ended in 1994, only shortly after the 1992
Constitutional Revolution. Though lacking updated data, we may suspect that
since 1994 there has been a growing reliance on Canadian, Australian, and
South African law, especially as some formulations in Israel’s Basic Laws were
founded upon provisions from the Canadian Charter. 105
B. The British Mandate and Its Legacy
One of the most convincing explanations for Israel’s strong reliance upon
common law sources, especially English precedents and scholarship, is the
historical tie between Israel and England, which began during the British
Mandate over Palestine. In 1922, in the aftermath of World War I, the British
were given a mandate by the League of Nations to prepare Palestine for selfgovernance. 106 As part of the preparation for self-rule, the British performed
considerable legal reform in Palestine, enacting new laws and ordinances,
restructuring the Ottoman legal system (which was based primarily on Muslim
and French laws), and introducing into Mandate Palestine many institutions of
the English common law. Many of the laws enacted in Palestine were based on
English and colonial legislation and used similar formulations. 107 The laws of
Palestine were also often interpreted by British colonial judges who drew on
English precedents in determining their scope and meaning. The 1922 Palestine
Order in Council, the “constitution” of the Palestine Mandate, provided that in
cases of lacunae, the Palestine courts were authorized to rely upon the common
law and doctrines of equity. 108 Furthermore, decisions of the Supreme Court of
Palestine could be appealed to the Privy Council. 109
Israel’s ties to English law outlived the Palestine Mandate and were
Israel, it has still served as a point of reference that informed the Court when formulating the
Israeli approach. This cannot be said for the German, Italian, or French approaches, which
were not even considered.
104. See Mattei, supra note 99, at 207.
105. See Emanuel Gross, The Procedural Rights of Suspects and Defendants, 15 BARILAN L. STUD. 155, 156 (1996). For example, Section 1 of the Canadian Charter “guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Part I of the Constitution
Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.). Similarly, Article 8
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has a similar provision that reads: “There shall be
no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State
of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose and to an extent no greater than is required.” Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391.
106. See The Palestine Mandate, art. 2, July 24, 1922.
107. See Daniel Friedmann, Infusion of the Common Law into the Legal System of
Israel, 10 ISR. L. REV. 324, 326 (1975).
108. See Palestine Order in Council 1922, art. 46; see also Friedmann, supra note 107,
at 359.
109. Palestine Order in Council 1922, art. 44.
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officially severed only in 1980. 110 The reasons for the ongoing reliance upon
English law were many. First, during the early years of statehood, Israeli courts
had only a limited body of local precedent from which to draw. Therefore,
when new questions arose, courts continued to rely upon English precedents
and continued to consult English authorities, much as they did during the
Mandate period. Second, until 1972, some laws that remained in force from the
Mandate period required Israeli courts to follow English interpretations and
precedents. 111 Third, even in cases in which the law made no such formal
requirement, since many statutory provisions were based upon the laws of
England (and were often even worded in the same manner), English precedent
remained highly useful and relevant in addressing problems of interpretation.
For example, the Israeli Evidence Ordinance continues to require that
confessions be “free and voluntary,” a wording that has remained unaltered
since its enactment under the British Mandate in 1924. 112 Even after Israel
severed all formal ties to English law in 1980, courts have continued to draw
upon English legislation and precedent.
C. Legal Education
A related factor that has contributed to Israel’s strong reliance upon the
common law is the legal education of Israeli judges and scholars over the years.
Beginning in the Mandate period, many of Palestine’s leading judges and
scholars traveled to England to pursue a higher legal education. Lawyers who
were trained locally did so in the “Law Classes,” a legal training program
established by the British in Palestine in 1920. 113 The tradition of legal
scholars seeking higher education in England continued after the establishment
of the state: well into the 1960s many of Israel’s leading jurists pursued their

110. See Foundations of Law Act, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 181 (1979-80) (Isr.), which in
Section 2 formally abolished Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council. The law
determined that in cases in which analogy, statute or case law provide no clear rule of
decision, the courts shall decide “in light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and
peace of Israel’s heritage” rather than based upon the “the substance of the common law, and
the doctrines of equity in force in England” mentioned in Article 46.
111. See Shachar et al., supra note 99, at 158. However, in 1957 the Israeli Supreme
Court ruled that it no longer considered itself obligated to rely upon English precedent even
when required so by law. Id.
112. Compare Evidence Ordinance § 9, 1 Laws of Palestine 670 (1924) (Isr.), with
Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971 § 12, 2 LSI 198 (1968-72) (Isr.).
113. See ASSAF LIKHOVSKI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE 110 (2006);
Friedmann, supra, note 107, at 326. Before the arrival of the British, the legal profession in
Palestine was extremely underdeveloped, with only approximately sixty practicing lawyers.
In 1930, the Bar had a membership of approximately 260 and by the end of the Mandate in
1948, this number had jumped to one thousand. See Nathan Brun, Early Foundations of the
Israeli Judicial System: Judges and Lawyers in Eretz-Israel 1908-1930, 84-85, 321-322 (Oct.
2003) (unpublished Doctor of Law dissertation) (on file with the author).
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studies for higher degrees in Oxford, Cambridge, and London. 114 As such
Israel can be viewed as part of a broader phenomenon whereby jurists in former
British colonies continued to seek their higher legal education in England’s
leading colleges rather than at local universities.
In legal education as in citation practices, the United States replaced
England in its status as a metropole of legal influence upon the Israeli
“periphery”; with time, the United States became the primary destination for
doctoral studies in law. 115 Furthermore, some of Israel’s leading jurists over
the years have been immigrants from the United States, 116 perhaps most
notably Chief Justice Simon Agranat (who delivered the opinion of the Court in
Yassin), who was a graduate of the University of Chicago. In recent years the
Israeli Supreme Court has routinely employed American law clerks to assist in
comparative research, thus furthering the influence of American law and the
law of other English-speaking countries upon the Court’s decisions.
However, legal education cannot entirely account for the dominance of the
common law’s influences upon Israel, at least not during the early years of
Israeli statehood. Although many of Israel’s leading jurists during the first
years of statehood were trained in Germany and other civil law countries, their
heritage had little influence upon the Israeli judiciary, at least as measured by
the Supreme Court’s citation practices. 117 Some argue that World War II led
German-trained jurists not to rely upon German law, especially in questions of
procedure. 118 After witnessing the atrocities of Nazi Germany, German
114. A partial list of Israeli jurists who sought their higher legal education in England
includes: Chief Justice Itzhak Olshan, Chief Justice Moshe Landau, Chief Justice Yoel
Sussman, Justice David Goitein, Justice Zvi Berenson, Justice Itzhak Zamir, Professor and
former Minister of Justice Amnon Rubinstein, Professor and former Israeli Ambassador to
the United Nations Yehuda Blum, Professor Ruth Gavison, Professor Hanina Ben
Menachem. The younger generation who studied in England in the 1980s includes
Professors Alon Harel and Alex Stein.
115. See A.M. Apelbom, Common Law A L’Americaine, 1 ISR. L. REV. 562, 578
(1996); Stephen Goldstein, Israel, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL
FAMILY 453 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed. 2001). The list is long but a few examples will be
mentioned: Justice Shneor Zalman Cheshin who served on the first Supreme Court was a
graduate of N.Y.U. Law School; Professor and Minister of Justice Daniel Friedmann;
Justices Ayala Procaccia and Asher Grunis; Professors Eyal Benvenisti, Celia Fassberg,
Zohar Goshen, Alexander Kedar, Assaf Likhovski, Ron Harris, Lucian Arye Babchuk, Leora
Bilski, Michael Birnhack, Yishai Blank, Aeyal Gross, Ehud Guttel, Menachem Mautner, and
Yoram Margaliot.
116. Dean Stephen Goldstein of the Hebrew University and Dean Arnold Enker of
Bar-Ilan University are examples.
117. A few such examples of Continentally trained jurists are Moshe Smoira, Israel’s
first chief justice, who studied law in Heidelberg; Justice Menachem Dunkelblum (Vienna);
Justice Haim Cohn (Frankfurt and Hamburg); Justice Alfred Witkon (Freiburg); Felix
Rosenbluth, Israel’s first Minister of Justice (Freiburg and Berlin); Uri Yadin, who served as
the head of the Legislative Division within the Ministry of Justice (Berlin). See Salzberger &
Oz-Salzberger, supra note 100.
118. See Stephen Goldstein, The Odd Couple: Common Law Procedure and Civilian
Substantive Law, 78 TUL. L. REV. 291, 293-94 (2003).
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immigrants and Holocaust survivors perhaps preferred the safeguards of AngloAmerican civil liberties and criminal procedural rights to the inquisitorial
systems in which they had been trained. 119
One must not underestimate the intensity of anti-German sentiment during
Israel’s early years. Israel did not establish diplomatic relations with Germany
until 1965; Israel’s willingness to accept reparations from Germany was highly
controversial during the 1950s and many Israelis have boycotted German
goods. As for legal influences, when the 1992 Penal Code was presented to the
Israeli Parliament, its German origins and influences were deliberately
downplayed to avoid possible opposition on that ground. 120 And by the time
Israel had become more willing to accept German law as a source of legal
inspiration, the number of those able to draw meaningfully on German sources
had shriveled.
D. Language and Availability of Sources
Language has also played an increasingly important role in promoting the
influence of Anglo-American law upon Israel. English is taught at Israeli
primary schools from an early age and is the only compulsory foreign language
in the Israeli matriculation exam. Even scholars who speak or understand other
foreign languages often do not have the requisite command to conduct
comparative legal research and rely only upon translated secondary sources and
materials. In this respect, the situation in Israel today stands in sharp contrast to
earlier years, when many jurists were immigrants who spoke multiple European
languages such as German, French, and Italian. 121
A closely related factor is the availability of sources. Due to a growing
language barrier and the general inability of Israelis to draw on non-English
sources, universities and libraries have cut back on their investment in books in
other languages. Furthermore, databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw,
which are often consulted by the courts when conducting comparative research,
have allowed far greater accessibility and ease of reference to sources from
English-speaking common law countries, while providing only limited access
to Continental European opinions.

119. Id. at 294; John H. Langbein, The Influence of the German Emigrés on American
Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUß DEUTSCHER
EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 321, 330
(Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993); Mattei, supra note 99, at 209.
120. Salzberger & Oz-Salzberger, supra note 100, at 278. The bill emphasized the
reliance upon other European jurisdictions such as Belgium, France, Switzerland, and
Iceland.
121. See supra note 117. Some additional examples are Professors Guido Tedeschi,
Gualtiero Procaccia, and Alfredo Rabello, who immigrated from Italy; Professor Claude
Klein, who immigrated from France; Professor and Justice Izhak Englard, who immigrated
from Switzerland.
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E. Israeli Procedure and the Common Law
Scholars have noted that the influence of the common law in Israel can be
sensed most profoundly in procedural fields. Stephen Goldstein observes a
similar phenomenon in other “mixed jurisdictions” such as South Africa,
Louisiana, Quebec, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines: although these
jurisdictions often apply substantive law founded upon Continental models,
they do so through common law procedure. 122 When trying to explain this
trend, Goldstein points to the “missionary zeal” with which England and the
United States implemented their procedural system abroad and the mysterious
“emotional attachment” that they created among colonized nations. 123 This
emotional attachment can be linked to what John Langbein has referred to as
the “Cult of the Common Law”—the protective aura that common law
procedures and institutions enjoy within Anglo-American jurisdictions due to
common law’s historic accomplishments in securing civil liberties such as
habeas corpus and trial by jury. 124
Goldstein also points out the “built-in lobby of the legal profession” for
retaining common law procedure. 125 Legal practitioners enjoy the greater
prestige that the common law affords them: lawyers enjoy “their heroic
gladiatorial role,” and judges enjoy the glory that comes with individually
written opinions (especially as compared to the seemingly bureaucratic role that
judges play in many Continental systems). 126 As noted above, Goldstein views
the experience of World War II as an additional factor that has caused Israel to
prefer common law procedure and has distanced it from inquisitorial
models. 127
F. Why Legal Doctrines Travel: Problem Solving, External Imposition and
Emulation
After examining the particular causes for Israel’s close relationship with
the common law, let us now turn to a slightly different line of inquiry: what
authority does comparative law command in Israeli courts, what purpose does it
serve, and what role did it play in the Issacharov opinion? As discussed earlier,
during certain periods in Israeli history, English law had an authority of binding
122. See Goldstein, supra note 118, at 292.
123. Id. at 294.
124. See Langbein, supra note 54, at 554.
125. Goldstein, supra note 118, at 295.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 294. For a discussion of this phenomenon within American legal
scholarship as well, see Langbein, supra note 119, at 330, and Langbein, supra note 54, at
554. Langbein notes a typical dismissal of comparative Continental procedure by American
scholars: “Before you go on telling me any more about the virtues of German civil
procedure, please explain why they had Hitler and we did not.” Langbein, supra note 54, at
554.
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precedent. Although English law no longer possesses this formal power,
decisions like Issacharov demonstrate that the common law still holds sway
beyond merely infusing foreign insight into a common legal problem. The
Supreme Court’s reliance upon the common law in Issacharov is closely linked
to the broader inquiry of how and why codes and legal doctrines travel, a
question that has sparked interest in recent years. Not only in Israel, but in
South America too, recent reforms of criminal procedure and rules of evidence
have revived the transplantation debate by grafting common law characteristics
onto historically inquisitorial procedure.
When trying to account for the legal reform in South America, scholars
have pointed to three groups of factors: problem solving, external imposition,
and emulation. 128 The problem-solving theory emphasizes the role of
comparative experience in supplying data and policy options for confronting
common problems, primarily judicial inefficiency and corruption in the South
American example. The external imposition theory emphasizes the role of
foreign countries (primarily the United States in the South American case) in
promoting change through economic and political incentives and threat of
sanctions.
Emulation theories suggest that countries often mimic practices of nations
they admire or with whom they wish to identify. According to this account,
legal borrowing often stems from a sense of identity and from the selfperception of the adopting country rather than solely from the wisdom of a
legal rule or its intrinsic value. Emulation theories bear a close relationship to
postcolonialism: many former colonies continue to emulate the law of the
metropole, though they are not formally obligated to do so, to express their
sense of identity. 129 Cultural scholars have noted such mimicry of nonlegal
trappings of the metropole in former colonies, which are sometimes exalted and
preserved with greater fervor than in Europe. 130 English practices, adopted by
colonial elites, have come to symbolize status. This theory of emulation fits
well within the broader framework discussed above concerning the legacy of
the British Mandate and the importance that obtaining a higher legal education
in a common law country has gained in legal academia and within the judiciary

128. See Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure:
Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 621-22, 666-69 (2007).
129. Id. at 622.
130. See, e.g., HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 85-92 (1994) (exploring
the concept of “mimicry”); Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in
INVENTION OF TRADITION 211, 261 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1993). Ranger
points out that Europeans are perceived as the “alpha and omega of gentlemanly refinement
and lady-like elegance” and that “the body of invented traditions imported from Europe . . .
in some parts of Africa still exercises an influence on ruling class culture which it has largely
lost in Europe itself.” However, Ranger also observes that European neotraditional
symbolism was not always adopted as a form of “aping” but by “an impressive display of
[Africans’] ability to keep up to date, to discern the realities of colonial power and to
comment shrewdly upon them.” Id. at 237.
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in Israel.
G. The Dangers of Treating Foreign Law as Precedent
Although Israeli courts are no longer bound by English precedent and
never were bound by other common law jurisdictions, Issacharov and decisions
like it hint strongly that comparative common law is not cited merely because it
“contains an insight that bears on the case at hand.” 131 Comparative law is
cited as authority on how the law should work and “has weight irrespective of
the cogency of its reasoning”; 132 it holds a power like that of precedent. Other
common law nations are viewed not as equals but with an aura of superiority.
To borrow a commonly used colonial metaphor, Israel looks to England and
other nations for parental approval of its jurisprudence. In this regard Israel can
be viewed as experiencing a broader postcolonial syndrome, residual of the
Mandate era. It clung to British traditions and heritage, with the common law
and developments in other former colonies and dominions serving as proxies of
English law. 133 Although Israelis do not tend to view Israel within a colonial
framework, it shares some of the emulation patterns that scholars have
observed in other British colonies in Asia and Africa. This sense of admiration
toward the English metropole can also been seen in the literary work of Israeli
authors such as Amos Oz. 134
However, emulating the laws of other common law nations and treating
them as binding precedent carry great risks, as Issacharov shows. Even
comparative law partisans in the United States such as Cass Sunstein, Eric
Posner, and Mark Tushnet caution against regarding foreign law as
“precedent.” Tushnet defines precedent as “a decision that carries normative
weight because of the authority of the court that issues it and not because of the
reasons that support it.” 135 A precedent leads courts to “accede to the authority
of the issuing court” even if they disagree with its reasoning. 136 Issacharov
131. Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007, at
53, 54 (reviewing AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2006)).
132. Id. at 54-55.
133. Friedmann regarded the influence of American law as an alternative to English
law during the early years of statehood when English precedent still had binding force in
Israel. American law was cited as authority when the Supreme Court found English law
unsatisfactory or undesirable for Israeli society. See Daniel Friedmann, Independent
Development of Israeli Law, 10 ISR. L. REV. 515, 522 (1975).
134. See AMOS OZ, A TALE OF LOVE AND DARKNESS 2 (Nicholas de Lange trans.,
2004) (2003) (“On my parents’ scale of values, the more western something was the more
cultured it was considered. For all that Tolstoy and Dostoevski were dear to their Russian
souls, I suspect that Germany—despite Hitler—seemed to them more cultured than Russia or
Poland, and France more so than Germany. England stood even higher on their scale than
France. As for America, there they were not so sure: after all, it was a country where people
shot at Indians, held up mail trains, chased gold and hunted girls.”).
135. See Mark Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1284.
136. Id.
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suggests we broaden this definition of precedent to apply where the citing court
fails to critically examine the reasoning of the cited opinion or the premises on
which it stands—in this case the bifurcation of the judicial process—but still
accedes to its authority.
Nevertheless, rather than regarding the Israeli example as proof of why
comparative law should not be referenced by American courts and citing
Issacharov as a case in point, one might instead focus on the differences
between Israel and the United States. Distinguishing between the two countries
may highlight the reasons why Americans have less reason to fear the citation
of foreign judgments than do other nations, including Israel. As Tushnet noted,
American judges are unlikely to view a foreign authority as binding in any
sense. Even American judges who refer to comparative law do so rarely and
only to ensure that a judgment arrived at independently is not “wildly
inconsistent with judgments elsewhere.” 137 The decision process in Issacharov
was quite the opposite: the decision was the product of an imagined disjuncture
between group norms. The Court looked at foreign practices and found Israeli
jurisprudence inconsistent with that of other countries, and therefore changed
Israeli law. To borrow a metaphor used by Canadian Justice Gerard La Forest,
in Issacharov comparative law became the master rather than the tool. 138
Israel’s position in the world may help explain the profound influence of
comparative law upon its judges: Israel is a young 139 and small country with a
fairly recent colonial past. Its limited experience and its desire to belong to a
broader community of nations with whom it most identifies may have moved it
to emulate other legal systems even when the analogies drawn have been
questionable and problematic. Foreign decisions may have been cited not solely
because of the quality of their reasoning or applicability to Israel, but primarily
because the courts that rendered them commanded authority and respect and
Israeli courts believed that they could not fall out of line with their rulings.
In contrast, the United States stands at the opposite end of the spectrum: its
post-World War II emergence as world leader in legal influence has endowed
its judges with the confidence not to conform to foreign practices. Its record for
initiating legal revolutions that later spread abroad may embolden its judges to
stand proudly even when standing alone. These factors, along with sentiments
of American Exceptionalism, which some scholars perceive to be at the core of
rejecting foreign law as a source of inspiration, 140 guarantee an effective
safeguard that the law of other nations will not be treated as binding precedent.
137. Id. at 1285.
138. R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 639 (Can.).
139. For a discussion of how and why the age of a country may affect reliance on
foreign law, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 131 (2006). The authors argue that young states are more likely to rely on foreign law
because they “have more to learn, and old states have more entrenched practices that are
harder to change.” Id. at 173.
140. Id. at 139; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1289-91.
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American judges citing foreign law already bear a considerable burden to prove
why the United States, as world leader, should care or follow what others say or
do. That they should treat other’s law as binding precedent seems unlikely. In
these circumstances, it may be useful (and humbling) to pause and wonder why
the United States should be different and whether, when standing alone on a
legal issue, it is on the proper side of the debate.
IV. TALKING ABOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
The previous Parts examined why the Israeli Supreme Court turned
exclusively to the common law in shaping the exclusionary rule and how its
reliance upon the common law may have led the Court astray in Issacharov.
But why did the Court frame Issacharov as a revolutionary ruling? Even if
other common law jurisdictions misled it, why did the Court not rely more
heavily upon Meiri to make the “creation” of the exclusionary rule seem less
like the result of judicial activism and more an extension of existing doctrine?
The rhetorical role of Issacharov, cast as a groundbreaking decision, and
comparative law’s role in legitimizing it are the focus of our attention now.
A. Issacharov and Miranda: Revolution or Evolution?
Although one of the key characteristics of the common law is the power of
judges to create and develop law, courts are generally reluctant to frame their
decisions as revolutionary, and judges usually try to avoid head-on
confrontations with other branches of government. Rather, courts typically
claim that their decisions flow from existing precedent or long-established
principles, even when they introduce significant legal innovations. The United
States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona is a case in point.
Justice Warren, writing for the Court, began his opinion by stating: “We start
here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an
innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long
recognized and applied in other settings.” 141
In crafting a highly controversial precedent the Warren Court saw great
importance in emphasizing its reliance on long-recognized principles.
Issacharov took the opposite course: the Court spurned the precedent Meiri
offered and proclaimed Issacharov as a revolutionary departure. 142 The Court’s

141. 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1965).
142. The one exception to this observation is Section 49 of the Issacharov decision, in
which the Court notes that Issacharov should not be regarded as an “unexpected revolution”
in evidence law but rather “an additional step in a gradual process.” However, this section
seems at odds with the decision’s general focus on the Constitutional Revolution, its effect
on evidence law, and the new balance created between crime control and due process.
Section 49 may be viewed as an attempt to tone down the revolutionary rhetoric of the rest
of the decision in an effort to avoid criticism. It is noteworthy that within that same section
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choice to formulate Issacharov as groundbreaking should come as an even
greater surprise considering that since 1999, six proposals to recognize a
statutory exclusionary rule have failed to win the Knesset’s approval. 143 The
heavy criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court for its judicial activism would
seem to present sufficient motivation to frame Issacharov as a direct derivative
of Meiri and within the boundaries of existing doctrine, rather than presenting it
as a creation of the Barak Court.
A number of attributes of Issacharov hint at why the Supreme Court
framed its opinion so boldly. Issacharov supplied a much-awaited opportunity
for the Barak Court to establish its legacy and write another chapter of the
Constitutional Revolution as applied to the procedural rights of criminal
defendants.
B. How Easy Cases Can Make Bad Law
As discussed in Part I, Issacharov dealt with illegal possession and use of
marijuana by an IDF soldier. Although criminal offenses tend to be treated
more severely when committed during an individual’s military service, Israeli
law (and society) does not regard marijuana use or possession as grave crimes.
First offenses frequently go unpunished and are often not even prosecuted for
lack of public interest. 144 The maximum sentence for drug use in Israel is three
years’ imprisonment, 145 a penalty that is usually reserved for possession or use
of more potent drugs. In Issacharov, the defendant was sentenced by the trial
court to two months’ probation that would be deemed violated only if he
committed an additional offense under the Drug Ordinance during the course of
the next eighteen months. 146
And according to the Supreme Court’s own account, by the time the Court
rendered its decision on Issacharov’s appeal, the case had become moot. The
the Court goes on to explain that although the Court had recognized its power to exclude
evidence before Issacharov, it refrained from doing so until the Basic Laws were passed,
once again emphasizing the innovation of the decision and the Constitutional Revolution’s
effect on this issue. According to the Court, it was the passage of the Basic Laws which
provided the “impetus for reexamining the question.” See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v.
Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet published), § 49, available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/98051210.n21.pdf.
143. Issacharov [2006] § 13 (citing the legislative proposals debated in the Knesset
thus far).
144. See Attorney General Guideline No. 4.1105 of Dec. 1, 1985 (updated Sept. 14,
2003), § 7 (entitled “Prosecution Policy—Drugs: Possession and Personal Use”). The
prosecutor in Israel holds the discretion not to prosecute offenses due to insufficient
evidence or lack of public interest. See Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version),
5742-1982 § 62, 36 LSI 35, 49 (1982) (Isr.); see also RUTH GAVISON, DISCRETION IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT: THE POWER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO STAY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
145 (1991).
145. Drug Ordinance, 5733-1973, 23 LSI 526 (1973) (Isr.), art. 7(c).
146. Issacharov [2006] § 5.

April 2008]

DOCTRINES WITHOUT BORDERS

2165

Court began its opinion in Issacharov with an apologia about why the eightyear time lag between the submission of the appeal and the decision did not
harm the defendant: since Private Issacharov received only probation, and since
he had not committed any similar crimes during his probation period, the ruling
had no effect on his sentence. 147 However, this justification cuts both ways in a
manner which the Court neglected to address: the fact that the defendant
committed no offense during this period made his conviction for drug use and
therefore the admissibility of his confession moot. 148 In the past the Israeli
Supreme Court has dismissed cases for being “hypothetical” and therefore
unworthy of the Court’s consideration and resources. 149 Given the length and
comprehensiveness of the Issacharov decision, the waste of judicial resources
on a hypothetical case is stunning. So was there more at stake in Issacharov
than a conviction for marijuana use?
The Court’s boldness in Issacharov contrasts strikingly with its reticence in
another case in which police conduct came to the attention of the Court in a
motion to suppress evidence. In 2002, while Issacharov was pending, the Court
faced a far more controversial and consequential matter: the Court delivered a
ruling admitting the confession of Steven Smirk, charged with membership in a
terrorist organization and conspiracy to provide information to an enemy. 150
Smirk was a German citizen who converted to Islam, joined Hezbollah, and
underwent extensive military training in Lebanon. He assisted Hezbollah in
collecting information and planning a suicide bombing in Israel. During a
reconnaissance trip to Israel, Smirk was caught and held in preventive arrest,

147. See id. § 13.
148. The decision affected only the number of prior convictions for drug use and
possession in Issacharov’s criminal record.
149. See HCJ 4827/05 Adam, Teva V’Din v. Minister of the Interior [2005]
(unpublished). For a discussion of the circumstances under which the Court will nevertheless
discuss a moot or hypothetical question, see HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense
[1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241. The Court explained that it would discuss such a case if it raised
important questions when there is “no practical way for the court to rule on it unless it was
presented as a general question, unconnected to any particular case.” Id. § 3. In Tzemach the
Court addressed the validity of a law that allowed a military adjudication officer to order the
arrest of a lower-ranking soldier who was suspected of committing a crime for a period of up
to seven days. The Court explained that this question would always become theoretical by
the time it reached the Court because of the short period of the arrest and the time needed to
petition the Court and schedule a hearing. The Court explained that the question is “shortlived . . . it is concrete for just a few days until the soldier is released or brought before a
military tribunal to extend his arrest . . . . If the Court did not agree to consider the
constitutionality of the detention, merely because the soldier has been released and the
petition has become moot, it would never be able to consider the question. The end result
would be to render the decision to detain soldiers immune from judicial review.” Id.
However, the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence does not generally raise a similar
concern of becoming moot by the time it is brought before a court.
150. CrimA 6613/99 Smirk v. Israel [2002] (unpublished). Justice Beinisch, who wrote
the Issacharov decision, delivered the opinion of the Court in Smirk as well, making the
inconsistencies between the two ever more striking.
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and later stood criminal trial. He was never told of his right to silence. That he
was denied access to counsel during two weeks of sleep deprivation and
continuous harsh interrogation was not contested. The police did not merely fail
to inform Smirk of his right to counsel, but denied him counsel in the face of
repeated demands.
The Court nonetheless adopted the government’s position that the
defendant was a “ticking bomb” and therefore the ongoing interrogation, the
methods of questioning employed, and denial of counsel were necessary and
legal in barring completion of terrorist activity. Since the actions of the Shin
Bet, Israel’s Secret Service, were justified on preventive grounds, the Court
dismissed the defense’s claim that the evidence should be excluded at Smirk’s
criminal trial—a determination that is all but trivial. In an English case raising
similar concerns, Lord Nicholls explained why evidence must be excluded in a
criminal trial even if the acts of the executive are justified:
The executive and the judiciary have different functions and different
responsibilities. It is one thing for tainted information to be used by the
executive when making operational decisions or by the police when exercising
their investigatory powers, including powers of arrest . . . . It is an altogether
different matter for the judicial arm of the state to admit such information as
evidence when adjudicating definitively upon the guilt or innocence of a
person charged with a criminal offence. In the latter case repugnance to torture
demands that proof of facts should be found in more acceptable sources than
information extracted by torture. 151

Nevertheless, the ruling in Smirk was highly formalistic, accepting the
lower court findings that sleep deprivation and failure to warn the defendant of
his rights did not cause the defendant to confess. The case was reduced to a
factual finding of a causal relation between the infringement of rights and the
defendant’s confession, with no discussion of the underlying normative issues
that took center stage in Issacharov.
Still, the Smirk Court did indicate that in appropriate cases denial of rights
could lead to exclusion of evidence, setting the stage for the Issacharov
decision. According to the Court, however, Smirk was not the right case for
such a ruling. 152 After all, a principled stance against illegally obtained
evidence in Smirk would have triggered the acquittal of a self-proclaimed
terrorist. Israeli public opinion would likely have condemned this result,
especially if the Court presented its exclusionary doctrine as “revolutionary.”
Acquitting a marijuana smoker was perhaps more palatable.
151. See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71 (H.L.)
(Eng.), § 70. The House of Lords excluded the evidence in that case even though it was
obtained by officials of a foreign state, and even though the Secretary of State did not seek
its admission in a criminal trial: the question was the admissibility of such evidence before
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).
152. See Smirk [2002] § 14. The Court explained that the denial of counsel was legal
and therefore the core of Smirk’s right to an attorney was not infringed, perhaps only his
right to appeal this denial.
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The Court may have reached the correct result in Smirk. Still, there is no
denying that Smirk presented a far more nuanced dilemma that could have truly
tested the Supreme Court’s protection of defendants’ rights. A genuinely new
approach to the exclusionary rule would have led to a drastically different
opinion, even had the outcome remained the same. In Issacharov the Court held
that deterring wrongful police conduct is not the sole consideration when
deciding whether to exclude evidence; courts must consider whether admitting
the evidence will undermine trial fairness or cause disrepute to the judiciary.
Smirk would have been a classic case for defining the precise boundaries of
such a doctrine and balancing between these competing public-policy
considerations: the severity of Smirk’s crime and the centrality of his
confession would have weighed in favor of admitting the evidence. On the
other hand, admitting a confession obtained by questionable interrogation
methods would certainly call into question the fairness of the trial and bring
disrepute on the judiciary. Police deterrence was not at issue, since the Court
ruled that the means used were appropriate, necessary, and legal to prevent
terrorist activity.
Nevertheless, the Court declined the opportunity to engage in a
controversial debate concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule. The
revolution was reserved for Issacharov, a low-stakes case, far less controversial
or complicated than Smirk, in which the same result could have been reached
under the existing Meiri doctrine. Easy cases make bad precedents for precisely
that reason: they avoid the true controversy surrounding the exclusionary rule.
Such cases give little guidance to lower courts on how to address the hard cases
in which courts are asked to exclude key evidence of a severe offense and to
acquit a dangerous enemy of society.
Apart from Smirk, in the eight years between the Issacharov hearing and
decision, the Court faced many other cases in which defense attorneys
requested the exclusion of evidence due to police misconduct. The Court
dismissed them all, but emphasized that it would consider excluding such
evidence in appropriate cases that might present themselves in the future, 153
perhaps referring to Issacharov, which was pending at the time. Why the Court
delayed decision for so long remains unclear. 154 We can only speculate about
153. See, e.g., CrimA 2180/02 Kassem v. State [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 642, 654; CrimA
5203/98 Hasson v. Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 274, 283.
154. The Court attributed the delay to two factors: first, the long period needed to
study the different facets of the exclusionary rule, its proper scope, and possible foreign
models; second, the desire to allow the Israeli parliament to consider pending legislative
proposals on this issue. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006]
(not yet published), § 13, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/
98051210.n21.pdf. However, as discussed above, the Court could have applied the Meiri
doctrine to decide this case, reaching the same outcome but avoiding the lengthy study
which made the case moot. More importantly, relying on Meiri would have allowed the
Knesset to define the rule as it saw fit. This only strengthens the impression that the Court
was eager to establish precedent and not defer to the legislature’s judgment.
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possible causes. Perhaps the Court was waiting for a better “test case” on which
to establish the new doctrine. Maybe the Court was waiting until it sensed that
public opinion would support such a move, and through the opinions leading up
to Issacharov the Court prepared the public for the coming change. 155 Perhaps
the Justices who supported exclusion in Issacharov faced opposition within the
Court and were awaiting the retirement of opposing judges; by the time
Issacharov was decided, six of the nine Justices on the original panel had
retired.
C. Unfinished Business: Issacharov and the Constitutional Revolution
The timing of Issacharov suggests that yet another factor may have played
a role in its selection and formulation as groundbreaking. The decision came
down almost eight years after the appeal was submitted 156 but more
significantly, only four months before the retirement of Chief Justice Aharon
Barak, who coined the term “Constitutional Revolution” 157 and who dedicated
much of his career as Chief Justice to expounding the Basic Laws. The timing
suggests that the Court was eager to render such a precedent, an Israeli
Miranda, before Barak’s retirement. Issuing the decision during Barak’s tenure
(albeit at the eleventh hour) helped cement the Barak Court’s status as the
Israeli Warren Court. Recognizing an exclusionary rule was an important
component of Barak’s vision of the Constitutional Revolution and its effect on
criminal law and procedure; he articulated this idea in a 1996 article. 158 Other
legal scholars supported Barak’s vision. 159 Some went so far as to hint that
Issacharov, pending before the Supreme Court at the time, might provide a
proper opportunity for developing such a doctrine. 160
Framing Issacharov as a quasi-constitutional doctrine flowing directly
from the Basic Laws bore symbolic significance: it underscored the importance
of the exclusionary rule and its status within the Israeli legal system. Exclusion

155. Posner, supra note 131, at 53 (“[Barak] borrowed from Marshall the trick of first
announcing a novel rule in a case in which he concludes that the rule does not apply, so that
people get accustomed to the rule before it begins to bite them.”).
156. The decision gives us no indication of the precise date in 1998 that the appeal was
submitted. However, we know from the decision that the Attorney General joined as a
respondent on September 9, 1998, which means that the appeal was submitted before that
date. A hearing was held on June 13, 1999, and the Court ruled that the case should be
decided by a broader panel of nine Justices. (In Israel, most cases are decided by a panel of
three Justices). Only three of the Justices on the original 1999 panel still served on the Court
when the decision was rendered in 2006 (Barak, Cheshin, and Beinisch). The remaining six
Justices were appointed to the Supreme Court after 1999.
157. See Barak, supra note 86.
158. See Aharon Barak, The Constitutionalization of Israeli Law: The Basic Laws on
Human Rights and Criminal Law, 13 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 5, 24 (1996).
159. See Gross, supra note 74; Harnon, supra note 22.
160. Gross, supra note 74, at 150 n.21.
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of illegally obtained evidence would no longer be merely a procedural matter
but rather a constitutional doctrine. In some respects this elevation placed the
rule beyond the Knesset’s reach, thus preempting and limiting subsequent
legislation on the matter. Although this move was not necessary to arrive at the
result in Issacharov, it did change the status of the exclusionary rule within
Israel’s pyramid of norms. The Court stripped away much of the legislature’s
ability to define the boundaries of the statutory exclusionary rule which the
Knesset had been considering. In this regard, Issacharov was indeed
revolutionary.
Conversely, placing the exclusionary rule within the purview of Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty also bolstered the status of the Basic Law
itself. Issacharov extended the reach of the Basic Law into a new realm,
emphasizing the Law’s constantly growing scope and its status as a cornerstone
of Israeli jurisprudence. Such reinforcement of the Basic Law brought it one
step closer towards becoming Israel’s Constitution or Bill of Rights rather than
a weaker quasi-constitutional provision. 161
D. Comparative Law and Legitimacy
We have seen why the Court sought out a case like Issacharov to proclaim
its new doctrine and why it was important to frame the decision as part of the
Constitutional Revolution. But by framing the decision as revolutionary, the
Court faced an acute problem of legitimacy and undermined its authority to
innovate. Creating new doctrines without legislative authorization and in
seeming defiance of legislative intent is no light matter, especially for a court
already under attack for its activism. Comparative law addressed this
legitimacy concern in Issacharov in two ways. First, it showed that courts in
other common law countries adopted a constitutional exclusionary rule absent
explicit legislative authorization. It thus demonstrated the law-creating power
of common law judges in this field and suggested that Israeli judges hold
inherent authority to do the same. 162
Furthermore, by relying upon the content of the exclusionary rule in other
common law jurisdictions, the Court justified its new creation as a necessary
result of international consensus. The Court relied on the reputation of the
foreign courts cited to make the “old rule” seem outdated, proving that reform

161. See CrimA 5121/98 Issacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006] (not yet
published),
§
54,
available
at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/98/210/051/n21/
98051210.n21.pdf (“The spirit and principles of the Basic Laws project in varying levels of
intensity upon all branches of the law and influence basic terms and perceptions therein.”).
162. For a criticism of Barak’s general approach toward the power of judges to make
law and its reliance upon the common law, see Posner, supra note 131, at 53-54. This also
might provide some further explanation of why the Court did not refer to civil law
jurisdictions, even if the Court was in fact aware that they too had adopted an exclusionary
rule.
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was essential. A judicially spearheaded revolution promised to bring Israel in
line with similar legal systems. The Supreme Court depicted itself as the
enlightened branch in contrast to the less progressive legislature. Hence,
comparative law served largely as a rhetorical tool that made the reform of
Israeli law appear inevitable. Casting the decision in this manner enabled the
Court to present the decision as an Israeli judicial revolution while drawing
legitimacy from abroad.
Comparative law in Issacharov served in an interesting double capacity.
First, it led the Court to the impression that reform was necessary to align
Israeli law with that of other common law countries (as discussed in Part II).
Then, in legitimizing the decision, comparative law justified such a revolution.
These two objectives may seem to conflict: according to the first, comparative
law is the culprit for potentially misleading judges and causing them to draw
misguided analogies, whereas under the second, there is nothing inherently
problematic with comparative law—only its rhetorical use by judges. However,
these two understandings need not be at odds with each other. Each comes into
play at a different point within the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the
role of comparative law in Issacharov highlights two of the dangers inherent in
its use: It may prompt one country’s misguided emulation of another. And it
may further serve to justify reform internally in the absence of legislative
authorization or in defiance thereof.
The Israeli Supreme Court’s use of comparative law to justify Issacharov
may seem to illustrate one of the primary dangers against which Scalia, Richard
Posner, and others who oppose the use of foreign law in the United States have
cautioned: that comparative law can be used as a rhetorical tool to mask
personal or political preferences. 163 Courts might justify controversial
decisions through reference to international consensus, making them seem
more objective and less as a result of their own political or moral convictions.
As Scalia stated in Roper, what truly drove the Court to deem the execution of
juveniles unconstitutional was “the court’s ‘own judgment’ that murderers
younger than 18 can never be as morally culpable as older counterparts.” 164

163. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Beyond the empty talk of a ‘national consensus,’ the Court gives us a brief glimpse of
what really underlies today’s decision: pretension to a power confined neither by the moral
sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment (its original meaning) nor even by
the current moral sentiments of the American people . . . . The arrogance of this assumption
of power takes one’s breath away.”). Scalia goes on to talk of the “contrived consensus”
which the Court has found. Id.; see also Richard Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term:
Forward: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 85, 88 (2005) (“The search for such a
consensus is an effort to ground controversial Supreme Court judgments in something more
objective than the Justices’ political preferences and thus to make the Court’s political
decisions seem less political . . . it is a ‘rhetorical’ move in the pejorative sense of the
word.”).
164. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 615 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia dismissed the Court’s comparative rhetoric as “sophistry.” 165
But such fears of misuse need not lead to a generally dismissive approach
towards using comparative law in judicial decision making. As Tushnet has
pointed out correctly, Posner and Scalia’s criticism on this count confounds
(perhaps justified) criticism of the ends to which comparative law is employed
with (unwarranted) criticism of the means. If Scalia and Posner are correct that
their counterparts wear comparative law as a façade, it is not comparative law
that should be blamed, but the end to which it is put by judges—to mask their
personal or political preferences. This criticism of comparative law feeds on
other critiques of judicial decision making and although typical of comparative
law, is neither unique not inherent in its use. 166
One need not dismiss all use of comparative law just because it bears the
potential of misuse. Even those who support the use of comparative law have
proceeded on the assumption that it is not being used rhetorically. 167
Obviously, determining when it is being used rhetorically is itself controversial
and may be influenced by one’s opinion of the outcome reached by the court.
But the potential for judicial misuse cannot justify abandonment of an
interpretive tool without requiring abandonment of all rules of construction.
Instead we should be wary of the typical misuses to which comparative law is
prone and the unique dangers it carries, some of which I have addressed here.
With due warning, courts should value comparative law as a source of foreign
wisdom and experience.
CONCLUSION
The Israeli Supreme Court’s revolutionary rhetoric will most likely mark
Issacharov as one of the groundbreaking decisions of the Barak Court era. Due
to its branding as innovative, Issacharov will be remembered by future
generations as Israel’s Miranda while the Meiri decision, which reached an
essentially identical outcome, will soon be forgotten. Within Israel, Issacharov
is an important omen of what is to come after the retirement of Chief Justice
Barak: Issacharov has reaffirmed the Beinisch Court’s commitment to the
Constitutional Revolution of the Barak era. It remains to be seen what shape
this Revolution will take under Beinisch’s leadership and what reactions it
might provoke from other branches of government. Also uncertain is
Issacharov’s impact on lower-court rulings in Israel and on the Supreme
Court’s own application of the exclusionary rule. Will Issacharov in fact result
in the exclusion of more evidence than Meiri? Will the Court be able in the
future to distinguish the Issacharov doctrine from Meiri despite their identical

165. Id. at 627 (“To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking and
ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking but sophistry.”).
166. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 1280-81.
167. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 139, at 137.
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operation in a unitary judiciary?
Issacharov also bears broader implications which are relevant beyond the
borders of Israel. The decision demonstrates some of the risks of using
comparative law and of transplanting foreign doctrines: the futility of precisely
replicating doctrines across borders and the dangers of false analogies when
attempting to do so. Issacharov also underscores the risks of emulation, of
regarding comparative law as binding precedent, and of courts using
comparative law as a rhetorical tool for legitimizing controversial decisions.
Nevertheless, the questionable fashion in which comparative law was
employed in Issacharov should not deter us from examining the experience of
other nations and learning from them whenever possible. Comparative law has
an important role to play in formulating new rules and doctrines and in
interpreting old ones, in Israel and elsewhere. Comparative law, like history,
can save us from repeating the mistakes of others. We may all benefit from
both the positive and negative experiences of other jurisdictions. However,
when doing so we must maintain the proper distance between self and other:
we must remember the differences between ourselves and the source from
which we borrow, and account for factors that might stretch or snap the
analogies drawn.
Although Issacharov demonstrates why one cannot expect to replicate
legal doctrines precisely or “transplant” them, engagement with foreign texts
and ideas can still enrich and inform our ideas for approaching and solving
common problems. But rather than seeing foreign law as a model to mimic we
must use it to start a conversation between equals. Adopted doctrines must be
adapted to suit local conditions, while accounting for factors that might
influence their operation. And even if we choose not to adopt the laws of
others, simply examining them may lead to a better understanding of ourselves.
By looking in the comparative mirror we are forced to see who we are and
determine what values we hold dear, why we are different and why, in some
cases, we ought to remain so.

